Scour damage to spillway channel following storms and resulting reservoir impoundments

Basic details

Publish date

28 October 2025

Case ID#

3342

Title

Scour damage to spillway channel following storms and resulting reservoir impoundments

Nation

Wales

Regulator reference no.

80

Legal status

Statutory

Reservoir type

Impounding

Reservoir capacity

10 - 24,999m3

Year of construction

1800 - 1849

Main construction type

Earth fill embankment

Dam height

2 - 4.99 metres

Dam flood category

B

Hazard class

High-risk reservoir

Reservoir use

  • Flood risk management

Owner type

Public body

Incident details

Date & Time of incident

14 January 2025 - 12:00

Date incident closed

12 September 2025

Observations that caused the incident to be declared

  • Water flowing outside of engineered channels

Describe the incident

Following routine surveillance, the Supervising Engineer was alerted of scour dam to the old narrow masonry spillway channel following storms in early January 2025 and resulting in reservoir impoundments. The hole in the spillway started at around 4pm from the upstream entrance of the spillway, which was approximately 4.5m in length / 1.5m in width and around 1m deep. SE attended site and initiated telephone discussions with the QCE. Remedial works were agreed on later that day, including MIOS improvement works to replace the existing spillway.

Supporting photos

 - supporting image

Causes and impacts

Natural processes which initiated or contributed to the incident

  • Heavy/persistent rain (no flood)

What were the main contributing factors to the incident occurring?

Dam factors

  • Deterioration of materials

External factors

  • None

Shortcomings

  • Construction shortcoming

What was the root cause of the incident?

Old narrow and inadequate masonry spillway channel deteriorating following storm / flood events, leading to scour damage. Effectiveness of permanent measures :- the new spillway facilities and channel were successfully tested during a heavy rainfall event (albeit at a very low water level compared to the safety check flood level) in September 2025, with a water depth of 140mm observed flowing through the new main spillway structure and channel.

Impacts on the reservoir

  • Spillway or overflow - failure or instability

Supporting photos

 - supporting image

Supporting contributions and studies

Describe any human factors which influenced the incident

None - MIOS improvement works to replace the old spillway structure and channel were already programmed to be carried out in Spring / Summer 2025 (ahead of the MIOS deadline), to take advantage of more favourable weather conditions for the construction works). 

Describe any instrumentation at the reservoir and how this was used in warning of the incident or providing monitoring during the incident

N/A with regards to instrumentation. The routine and reactive surveillance visits to the site proved to be very effective in detecting the issue and promptly alerting the SE and Undertaker.

Was instrumentation effective leading up to and during the incident?

Not Applicable

Describe any assistance by external parties and impacts on the downstream population

N/A

Summary of studies or investigations undertaken

None following incident :- the new main spillway structure and channel, including the new auxiliary spillway facility, which were built in Summer 2025, have been designed to reservoir category B standards in terms of capacity and construction material (i.e. design flood 1 in 1000 year and safety check flood 1 in 10,000 year), and subsequently signed off and certified by the QCE – the new spillway facilities are therefore a vast improvement in terms of capacity and robustness. The reservoir freeboard was also improved during the Summer 2025 works.

What are the lessons learnt from the incident

Lesson 1

Lessons learned :- Continued routine and reactive (following storm / impoundment events) surveillance of the dam is essential. The system the Undertaker has in place worked well, with the incident being immediaely escalated to the SE, who in turn immediately made contact with ARPE / QCE. On the same day as the initial call from the Undertaker from site, an MS Teams meeting had been held between the SE, Undertaker and QCE, and appointed contactor, to agree the required remedial works and timescale. By the 21st January 2025, the temporary repairs to the spillway were complete

Lesson 2

Lesson 3

Lesson 4

Closing comments

Supporting photos

 - supporting image