Near miss: unexpected site features led to poor construction practices and the weight limit of a service reservoir roof being exceeded
Publish date
10 September 2025
Case ID#
3333
Title
Near miss: unexpected site features led to poor construction practices and the weight limit of a service reservoir roof being exceeded
Nation
England
Regulator reference no.
548
Legal status
Statutory
Reservoir type
Service
Reservoir capacity
25,000 - 99,999m3
Year of construction
1950 - 1969
Main construction type
Unknown
Dam height
5 - 9.99 metres
Dam flood category
A
Hazard class
High-risk reservoir
Reservoir use
- Water supply
Owner type
Limited company
Date & Time of incident
12 March 2024 - 12:00
Date incident closed
12 June 2024
Observations that caused the incident to be declared
- Other (including pollution and unplanned scour release)
Describe the incident
The drawings provided to a contractor did not accurately reflect the position of the existing pipework within the reservoir. As a result, the team worked from assumptions, leading to the pre-laid pipework being installed too long. In responding, a lack of understanding of working near reservoir embankments led to the near miss. The Team Leader made several unsuccessful attempts to free the 3-ton excavator before deciding to use the 5-ton excavator.
Valves and test ends had already been bolted into position where the concrete ring was due to be installed. To avoid disruption, the team chose to pull the pipework back and cut it from the opposite end.
As daylight was fading, the Team Leader was concerned about leaving the excavator in position overnight. He decided to ensure all plant was returned to the compound for security.
The team was not aware of any restricted areas within the reservoir or that the reservoir roof had a weight limit.
Existing vehicle markings were visible on the verge leading onto the reservoir roof, which reinforced the team's assumption that this was a safe access route.
The team did not follow the Contractors SLAM procedure (Stop, Look, Assess, and Manage).
The incident was not reported internally by the team; it was identified by the reservoir undertaker's personnel.
The Contractor SHEQ Team was not informed until a week later.
Supporting photos
Natural processes which initiated or contributed to the incident
- None
What were the main contributing factors to the incident occurring?
Dam factors
External factors
- Human error
- Other external factors (describe below)
Shortcomings
- Process or procedural shortcoming
What was the root cause of the incident?
The drawings provided to the team did not accurately reflect the position of the existing pipework within the reservoir. As a result, the team worked from assumptions, leading to the pre-laid pipework being installed too long.
Valves and test ends had already been bolted into position where the concrete ring was due to be installed. To avoid disruption, the team chose to pull the pipework back and cut it from the opposite end.
This led to a change in works, and a 3T excavator was being used to remove the pipework, to cut it on site. The 3T excavator got stuck on the bank. The Team Leader made several unsuccessful attempts to free it before deciding to use the 5-ton excavator.
As daylight was fading, the Team Leader was concerned about leaving the excavator in position overnight. He decided to ensure all plant was returned to the compound for security. The team was not aware of any restricted areas within the reservoir or that the reservoir roof had a weight limit.
The team did not follow the Contractors SLAM procedure (Stop, Look, Assess, and Manage).
Impacts on the reservoir
- None - near miss
Supporting photos
Describe any human factors which influenced the incident
The contractor team was not aware of any restricted areas within the reservoir or that the reservoir roof had a weight limit. Existing vehicle markings were visible on the verge leading onto the reservoir roof, which reinforced the team's assumption that this was a safe access route.
The team did not follow the Contractors SLAM procedure (Stop, Look, Assess, and Manage).
Describe any instrumentation at the reservoir and how this was used in warning of the incident or providing monitoring during the incident
No instrumentation at site
Was instrumentation effective leading up to and during the incident?
Not Applicable
Describe any assistance by external parties and impacts on the downstream population
None
Summary of studies or investigations undertaken
A comprehensive review of the undertaker's project management process was conducted, with recommendations provided for improvements in areas such as early contractor engagement and the development of Pre-Construction Information (PCI). The Contractor made some recommendations to prevent reoccurence.
Discussion to be held with the team re-informing them of the Browne SLAM procedure, ensuring that the team are aware if something out of the description of the on-site RAMS or on-site issues are discovered, works are to stop and findings reported to their Supervisor.
Issuing of a safety briefing/toolbox talk highlighting the dos and don'ts of working within a reservoir environment.
ACTION PLAN
Issuing of a safety briefing/toolbox talk highlighting the dos and don'ts of working within a reservoir environment.
RAMS to be updated covering restrictions in place for access to roof of Reservoir.
Updated RAMS to be discussed with site team and briefing record issued and signed by all parties.
Safety Briefing to be created and issued across business highlighting the dangers of working within Reservoir environments.
Site team to be re-briefed on the importance of following Contractor SLAM procedures. Briefing record to be issued and signed by all parties.
Contractor Incident Reporting Procedure to be re-briefed to Site Supervisor ensuring that the procedure is followed for all incidents going forward.
The Undertaker conducted a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) investigation to assess the impact of the incident on the structure. No structural defects were identified.
In summary, the Contractor concluded that the
"The team did not follow Contractors SLAM procedures. As soon as the 3T Excavator had become stuck the team should have stopped work, reported the issue to their Supervisor so that alternative methods could have been discussed, received confirmation of weight restrictions and agreement/approval sought for any attempt to access the roof of the reservoir".
Improvements identified by the Undertaker's project teams includes.
· Identify not just the works area, but also restricted areas within our RAMS
· Review of PCI
· Review of site authorisation and induction process
Lesson 1
- General design and construction
- Records and studies
Ensure buried services and assets are accurately surveyed and drawings updated before excavation begins.
Verify the suitability and dimensions of prelaid materials in advance to avoid delays or unplanned modifications.
Lesson 2
- General design and construction
- If site conditions change or designs change, ensure that work is stopped, risks and site specific hazards are re-assessed and appropriately mitigated prior to re-starting work.
- Plan for sufficient workspace by considering nearby assets, access requirements, and boundary constraints during design and preparation.
- Factor in how additional structures such as shafts or slip trenches can further restrict working space and plan mitigations accordingly.
- Communicate any weight restrictions on critical infrastructure (e.g., reservoir roofs) clearly to all site teams.
- Review site history and visible ground evidence (such as vehicle tracks) to assess potential risks before commencing works.
- Install clear, visible signage to warn teams of fragile structures and enforce weight restrictions.
- Allow adequate daylight working hours and avoid pressuring teams to complete complex tasks under unsafe time constraints.
Lesson 3
- General design and construction
Ensure any contractors and their staff working on reservoir sites are aware of the specific risks and hazards, for example weight limits or plant restrictions on dam banks. Ensure contractors are aware of the requirement to report reservoir safety incidents, and that they do so to the undertaker promptly.